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Kaufman: Cardozo

CARDOZO *
Andrew L. Kaufman **
When I started to prepare this talk, I realized that of all the
Cardozo talks I have given since I completed my book 22 years ago,
this one was unique because the audience is unique. I can presume
some familiarity with my subject matter and so I can focus on rather
different things from what I usually talk about.
I thought I could do that best by starting with some biographer
stories. I took so long completing the Cardozo book that enough things
occurred along the way that I could make up a book of interesting back
stories. The first involves a Touro connection, Chief Judge Sol
Wachtler. I learned early on in my researches that the Court of Appeals
had a collection of 600 memoranda circulated to the court by Cardozo
in matters originally destined to be handled per curiam. Five
successive chief judges – Conway, Desmond, Fuld, Breitel, and Cooke
– understandably refused me permission to see them on the ground that
they were written as confidential documents solely for the other
judges. Not long before I finished my manuscript I paid a visit to Chief
Judge Wachtler. His attitude was that the court should be helping me,
not hindering me, and he persuaded the court to let me see them. I only
had to show the court what use I made of them. Eventually, I submitted
them to Chief Judge Kaye who not only read the sections of the book
that use those memos but she also read the whole manuscript for me
and commented on various parts.
While I was in Chief Judge Wachtler’s office, he told me the
following story on himself. He pointed to his desk and said it had been
Cardozo’s desk. And then he said that he had shown the same desk to
*This is a slightly edited

version of the keynote address given at the Touro Cardozo conference.
The talk itself is a much abridged version of a video presentation prepared as part of a legal
history series created in 2017 to celebrate the 200th anniversary of the founding of the Harvard
Law School. The expanded talk may be found at http://200.hls.harvard.edu/talks/harvardx/.
**Charles Stebbins Fairchild Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
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a visitor who responded that after Wachtler had finished using it, the
desk would still be “Cardozo’s desk.” I am sure that wherever that
desk is today, it is still “Cardozo’s desk.”
One of the first things I did when I began research was to try to
talk to people who had known Cardozo personally. There weren’t too
many still around because Cardozo had been dead for almost 20 years
when I started work in 1957. One was Charles Burlingham, who was
then thought of not only as the dean of the New York bar but also as a
behind the scenes judgemaker. He was influential not only in putting
Cardozo on the bench and advancing Cardozo’s judicial career but he
also did the same for Learned Hand and others. Burlingham was 99
and blind when I interviewed him but his mind was still exceedingly
sharp. When the interview was over, he told me to shake his hand.
After I did so, he said that I had now shaken the hand of a man who
had shaken hands with Abraham Lincoln. Burlingham’s father was an
inspector of the Union’s Sanitary Commission during the Civil War.
He took his six-year old son Charles with him to Washington for a
Commission meeting in 1865 and Charles had gotten to shake the
President’s hand. (After lunch, you may shake my hand if you’d like
to shake the hand of a man who shook the hand of a man who shook
hands with Abraham Lincoln.)
One mystery while I was writing the book was the sound of
Cardozo’s voice. Although he spoke to me constantly during the 38
years I worked on the book – usually saying “what’s taking you so long
– get on with it,” I had been puzzled by descriptions of the enthusiastic
reactions to Cardozo presentations. They were hard to square with the
other contemporaneous descriptions of a “gentle, modest, self
deprecating Cardozo.” Just before I turned in the manuscript for my
biography, David Warrington, head of Special Collections in the
Harvard Law School library, who knew that I was looking for a
recording of his voice, saw that the Library of Congress had just
acquired a wax recording that had been made of a talk given by
Cardozo in 1931 at a dinner to honor Nicholas Murray Butler, the
president of Columbia University. But when I got a copy of that record
and listened to Cardozo’s quite mundane remarks on that occasion, I
was just blown away. I could have been listening to William Jennings
Bryan himself. Cardozo was an orator in the 19th century style. And
I understood immediately why he was such a captivating speaker, and
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also why he had been such an effective trial and appellate lawyer –
because he just had the most marvelous speaking voice. 1
The shelf life of judicial reputation is short. How many judges
from 100 years ago can anyone, even a lawyer, recall, except perhaps
as a name? Benjamin Nathan Cardozo is an exception. He is one of
the very few judges of that era whose name currently means something
to the legal profession and beyond. Unlike any other contemporary, he
is still remembered for his career as a state court judge and also, albeit
somewhat less, for his career on the United States Supreme Court. The
messages he left behind, in both his judicial and his extrajudicial
writing, still resonate today.
Benjamin Cardozo lived for the law and the law made him
famous. I have time for just a few highlights from his life as a human
being – as a lawyer for 23 years, and as a judge for another 23 years.
His heritage was an important part of his life. Benjamin took pride in
the fact that his Cardozo and Nathan ancestors arrived in New York
before the Revolution and that their synagogue, Shearith Israel, the
Spanish and Portuguese Synagogue, was already over 125 years old
when the Revolutionary War was won. Its rabbi, Gershom Seixas, was
the first Jewish trustee of the college that was to become Columbia
University. Benjamin Cardozo would be the second. His uncle,
Benjamin Nathan, for whom he was named, was a Vice-President of
the New York Stock Exchange. In Benjamin Cardozo’s generation,
one first cousin, Emma Lazarus, was the author of the poem that graces
the base of the Statue of Liberty; another first cousin, Maud Nathan,
was a well-known suffragist, social reformer, and president for thirty
years of the Consumer’s League of New York; and yet a third first
cousin, Annie Nathan Meyer, was a playwright and the founder of
Barnard College. The Cardozos, the Nathans, and other Sephardic
Jews were well established in this country economically and even
politically and socially when the waves of immigration from Central
and then Eastern Europe began in the last third of the nineteenth
century. Small wonder that they considered themselves the aristocracy
of American Jewry.
Cardozo’s growing up years were shadowed by the experience
of his father, one of Boss Tweed’s Tammany judges, who resigned
from the bench just as he was about to be impeached for corruption by

1 The expanded talk referred to in note * contains a brief recorded excerpt from that
recording.
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the legislature. Although his father returned to the practice of the law,
the family disgrace surely had an impact. Cardozo had a private tutor
who tutored him for two years from the age of thirteen for the entrance
exam to Columbia. The tutor’s name was Horatio Alger, the Horatio
Alger of rags to riches literature who earned a living, in part, by
tutoring the children of the wealthy. Earlier in his life he had been
dismissed from his position as a minister for sexually abusing children
of his congregation. No evidence exists of subsequent misconduct
either with his many tutees or with the large numbers of homeless
street boys whom he subsidized, but of course the question remains.
Cardozo’s youth ended with his career at Columbia, which he
entered at age 15, the youngest in his class. He lived at home with his
twin sister, two older sisters, and an older brother who was practicing
law in their father’s firm. Benjamin’s mother had died when he was
nine and his father died during Benjamin’s first year at college.
Benjamin did not participate much in the social life of the school. He
worked hard, did very well, won several prizes, and went straight from
college into Columbia Law School. The instruction there consisted
mostly of lectures about the rules and doctrines of law without much
analysis. The Socratic method of questioning students and analyzing
doctrine critically that was associated with the Harvard Law School of
Christopher Langdell arrived at Columbia Law School during
Cardozo’s second year. He did not much take to it. Columbia had
recently added a third year of study, but Cardozo, along with two-thirds
of his class, left at the end of his second year. He was not yet 21.
Cardozo was admitted to the bar as soon as he reached 21. He
joined his brother in their father’s politically-oriented firm, and began
practicing law. Almost immediately, he began to make a name for
himself, arguing several cases in the New York Court of Appeals in
the first years of his practice. The practice of law was very different
then from what it has become. The bar was relatively small, and most
major firms had just a few partners. A good lawyer could make his
(and they were virtually all “his”) way quickly, and Benjamin Cardozo
established himself as a good lawyer very early in his career.
Early success also imbued him with a self-confidence that
demonstrated itself at a crucial moment in the history of his
congregation. While Cardozo was still a young lawyer, he made a
dramatic appearance at Shearith Israel. The efforts of German Reform
Judaism throughout much of the nineteenth century to “modernize”
Jewish religious traditions and practices had been increasingly
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successful in the United States. The “modernization” issue was raised
at Shearith Israel at a congregational meeting in 1895 in the context of
a motion to end gender-segregated seating. The minutes of the meeting
record matter of factly that four speeches in support of the motion were
made, all by Cardozo’s close relatives, and that Dr. Mendes, the
preacher, and another spoke in opposition. The minutes then
characterize a final speech by Benjamin Cardozo as “a long address,
impressive in ability and eloquence.” The progressive judge would
support bringing the practices of the congregation into the modern era,
right? Wrong. He argued that the principle of the separation of the
sexes was embodied in the synagogue’s Constitution because that
document specifically forbade any boy from entering the women’s
gallery. A vote by the electors to adopt the motion would violate that
Constitution. Cardozo warned that if that was done, there were laws
outside the synagogue to which the opponents could turn. The electors
then rejected the motion overwhelmingly.
There were three notable features to this event: that Cardozo
appeared, that he spoke, and that he spoke in opposition to the motion
to end segregated seating. He had long been absent from religious
services in the synagogue. Moreover, his father, a man of prominence
in the Sephardic community, had lived out his life in disgrace after
resigning from the bench. It therefore took a strong sense of self, some
chutzpah, for the twenty-five-year-old Cardozo to have taken a
leadership position on this issue. The incident certainly demonstrates
that in a few short years of professional life the young man, who had
been perceived as a shy and aloof student at Columbia, had gained an
enormous public presence. It is apparent that the shyness concealed a
self-confidence that came forth very early in his professional career. It
also demonstrates that although Cardozo had ceased to engage in the
practice of the Jewish faith, he had not fled his Jewish heritage. He
thought of himself as a Jew to the point where he returned in a moment
of crisis, not to pray, but to uphold a major formal feature of the
religious practice of his Congregation.
The court records from his years at the bar show a very active
trial and appellate practice. As time went on and he demonstrated his
ability, more and more lawyers referred their important or difficult
cases to him. His practice was largely oriented toward commercial and
family matters. Modern-style brief writing was not yet well
established. Many, perhaps most, briefs consisted of conclusory
arguments coupled with citation of, and quotation from, relevant cases.
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Cardozo immediately adopted the modern, more useful style that
began with a statement of the facts and the questions to be decided and
then went on to argument based on critical analysis of doctrine and
policy supporting the desired result. When the policy arguments were
not strong, Cardozo argued from the facts, and he could make technical
arguments with the best. In short, he used the best available
ammunition to support his case that he could find, and he argued
persuasively, and with style.
Cardozo’s skill as a lawyer was not solely in the setting of the
appellate courts; he was also a fine trial lawyer. His approach was that
of an advocate, not an academic. And what an advocate! Cardozo was
a tiger, who would attack the opposition with every weapon at hand –
the facts, the law, technicalities, humor, sarcasm, even barbs directed
at the parties, witnesses, and counsel on the other side. His ability and
his connections in the Sephardic community brought him business, and
most of his business consisted of difficult matters that were referred to
him first by his Jewish friends and later by a wider circle of New York
lawyers.
Although, with time, the matters he handled involved larger
sums of money and his practice became more varied, he never became
a Brandeis-type lawyer taking on large social issues of great public
importance. Only once did he engage in communal legal work. At the
request of the activist Jewish lawyer Louis Marshall, Cardozo
represented, pro bono, the Russian Massacre Fund on the question of
the disposition of the remainder of the funds that had been raised for
the benefit of Russian Jews who had suffered as a result of pogroms.
Other than that, he did no communal work of any sort during his years
of practice.
As he entered his early forties, his professional path seemed
set. Then chance intervened. 1913 was the occasion for a periodic
convulsion in the New York City political world. A diverse group of
reformers, anti-Tammany Democrats, and Republicans united to
produce a joint Fusion ticket in the local elections to try to wrest
control of the local government from Tammany Hall. Putting together
a ticket for the various executive and judicial positions required
considerable negotiation among the different groups. A subcommittee
on judges was looking for a Jew to balance the ticket. Cardozo’s name
was eventually suggested to the subcommittee chair, Charles
Burlingham, who made the case for Cardozo to the Fusion group. The
Fusion ticket was generally successful, and Cardozo, running against
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an incumbent, barely squeaked through with the aid of some Bronx
County dissident Tammany Democrats.
As he took the bench in 1914, he had been a practicing lawyer
for 23 years. Those practice years had a major impact in preparing
Cardozo for his judicial career.
His college and law school education provided a
substantial amount of intellectual capital and the habits
of reading and study that lasted his whole life. His work
matured him socially, and his colleagues soon
discovered not only his ability but the strength of his
character and personality. Having lived a sheltered
personal life, he used his work as his window on the
world. A good litigator gets to understand people, both
their strengths and their weaknesses. His work gave
him firsthand experience with the human condition,
with human frailty, trickery, and deceit. A good
litigator also learns a good deal about the subject matter
of his cases. Cardozo read widely and was more
familiar with new ideas than most practicing lawyers,
but he came to the bench with a view of the judge’s role
as a resolver of disputes, not as a dispenser of legal
theory. Even though his experience as a judge would
enlarge his view of the judicial role, Cardozo never lost
his lawyer’s touch. 2
Cardozo tried cases as a trial court judge for just one month
before he was appointed by the Governor to fill one of the temporary
Court of Appeals positions that existed to help that court clean up its
backlog. Three years later he was appointed and then elected to a
regular term on the Court of Appeals. Cardozo’s first few years on the
Court of Appeals were a time of legal ferment. The realist movement
roiled the academic world, and its critique influenced judicial decisionmaking. Some of Cardozo’s early opinions were instant hits. Wood v.
Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon, 3 involving interpretation of a contract with
an eye to the nature of business relationships, and MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 4 found their way very quickly into law school curriculums.

2
3
4

ANDREW KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 112-13 (Harvard University Press 1998).
118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
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The latter especially was heralded as an example of adapting ancient
common law doctrine to the needs of modern industrial society.
Cardozo is remembered as one of the judges who brought the
common law into the twentieth century, a judge who adapted the
general principles underlying centuries of traditional law to the
dynamic changes of an industrializing society, a judge who realized
that the atomized societies of previous centuries were becoming more
and more interdependent and that law needed to recognize the new
economic and social reality. While a careful reading of the body of
Cardozo’s work supports that conclusion, it does not portray the whole
Cardozo. There was another Cardozo, who gave more weight to, or put
more burdens on, the other organs of government. A great many of his
most famous opinions are matched by an opinion in an analogous case
in which he did not modernize the law, did not create a new duty to
reflect changes in society. Cardozo modernized most in situations
where the way had been foreshadowed, or at least hinted at, in previous
legislative or judicial action in his own state.
On the other hand, Cardozo believed that his position as a judge
in a democratic society counseled leaving the responsibility for law
reform to the legislature when issues were complex and the
consequences for change uncertain. His references in many opinions
to possible limits on the doctrine being enunciated were not window
dressing to be ignored in subsequent opinions. Quite often the lawyerly
ingenuity that expanded a principle enunciated a limitation to the
principle as well. For example, the seminal opinion imposing liability
on auto manufacturers to the ultimate buyer of its defective product is
matched by an opinion refusing to impose liability on a public utility
to the company whose property was destroyed by fire, allegedly
because of failure of the water company to supply water at specific
hydrants. 5 Indeed, a series of cases in which Cardozo invoked doctrine
and policy in support of liability based on foreseeability of risk or
danger is matched by a series of cases in which he invoked doctrine
and policy to deny foreseeability-based liability. One can find other
series of such paired cases throughout the various areas of doctrine that
he considered during his 18 years on the New York Court of Appeals.
In just a few years on the bench Cardozo made a name for
himself. By 1921 his growing reputation was recognized in three
distinct ways. He was selected to the Board of Overseers of Harvard
5

Moch Co., Inc. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928).
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University. He was invited to lend his support to a project of the
Association of American Law Schools to organize what would become
the American Law Institute, most known for regularly publishing
“Restatements” of bodies of law such as contracts and torts. Finally,
he delivered the Storrs Lectures at the Yale Law School. Those lectures
have been read by hundreds of thousands in the succeeding years under
the title of The Nature of the Judicial Process. 6
Cardozo was the first judge in modern times to try his hand at
describing what judging was all about. Indeed, The Nature of the
Judicial Process helped create what has become a cottage industry as
interest in the subject of judicial decision-making has grown not only
in the academy but perhaps more importantly among the general
public. First Cardozo and then other judges and judicial philosophers
have written in increasingly theoretical fashion about the subject.
However, over ninety years later Cardozo’s initial effort is still being
read, with profit.
When Cardozo delivered his lectures, the diverse academic
movement known as “legal realism” was in full flower. A theme of
that movement was its attack on what it portrayed as a formalist,
mechanistic approach to judging. The previous half century had been
characterized for its emphasis on judge-made law as having its own
internal consistency, with doctrines derived from first principles
independent of the politics of the day. Judges, it was said, “found” and
did not “make” law, and they deduced the governing rules in a
particular case from the decided precedents. The extent to which that
portion of the realists’ attack on their predecessors was based on
inaccurate caricature is still a matter of some debate, but there is little
doubt that one of Cardozo’s purposes in delivering The Nature of the
Judicial Process was to acknowledge the importance of sources
beyond precedent for judicial decision-making as well as the inevitable
element of “law-making” discretion that appellate court judges
exercise in close cases.
Cardozo described four major sources of material for judicial
decision-making – logic, history, custom, and public policy. 7 He
devoted a lecture to each of these. He treated history and custom as
more specialized doctrines that were powerful decision-making factors
only in those relatively few cases when there was enough evidence of

6
7

BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
Id. at 30-31.
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either to be relevant. He regarded logic, the use of deductive analysis
from principles already established, as having a certain presumption in
its favor and as governing in the absence of strong arguments from
history, custom, or public policy. While logic as he defined it was
backward looking, his incorporation of the notion of deciding by
analogy also had a forward-looking aspect.
The bulk of Cardozo’s lectures, however, consisted of analysis
of the effect of public policy considerations – a normative approach
based on contemporary values – on judicial decision-making. He both
endorsed the importance of using law to achieve social justice and
warned against the dangers that could accompany the abandonment of
established principles, certainty, and order. Judges were agents of
change, but not too much and not too often. The trick was to know
when to innovate and when to refrain.
Cardozo was no revolutionary. His vision of the judicial role
was a version of what English and American judges had done for
centuries, reaffirmed and adapted for modern use. He believed that the
major role in guiding social change in a democracy belonged to the
legislature and the executive. Thus, he innovated most when the step
to be taken was modest and when the innovation did not violate what
he saw as the prerogatives of other institutions of government – and
ideally when the legislative or executive branch had already pointed
the way. While Cardozo often adapted law to new social conditions,
he also often declined to make such adaptations. Fairness was
important to him, but he did not believe that judges could always do
what they thought was fair or just. Cardozo believed that he had to
respect precedent, history, and the powers of other branches of
government. Judging involved taking all these factors into account,
methodically and as impartially as he could.
A common complaint offered by judges and others is that
Cardozo’s prescription does not help a judge to decide a particular
case. Of course not. Indeed, in a way, a subtheme of Cardozo’s lectures
is that judicial decision-making involves a nuanced approach among
different considerations, any one of which may be dominant with
respect to a particular issue or in the context of particular facts. He was
essentially an accommodationist, but the totality of his messages was
ambiguous. That ambiguity, I think, has contributed to his enduring
reputation. How one applies Cardozo to different situations depends
on what strand of thought is emphasized in different contexts. Even
judges who subscribe fully to his messages will put the elements of
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decision-making together in different ways in particular cases, each
side able to cite different Cardozo words for support.
Cardozo carried forth his prescription into the field of
constitutional law as well, expressing the view that public policy
considerations had their strongest justification in that field. Indeed, he
outlined a controversial view, which he expounded as a Justice of the
Supreme Court, that “the content of constitutional immunities is not
constant, but varies from age to age.” 8
The Nature of the Judicial Process was not a work of
philosophy. Although Cardozo was well read in works of philosophy
and often quoted or cited philosophers to support a particular insight,
he was not interested in attempting to set out a comprehensive theory
of judging that was grounded in philosophy. His purpose was to
explain the art of judging from his perspective as a judge and former
practicing lawyer. At the end of the Lectures, he issued a word of
caution about everything he said. While he refused to quarrel with the
notion that a judge reflects “the spirit of the age,” he was skeptical
about what that was. “The spirit of the age,” he wrote, “as it is revealed
to each of us, is too often only the spirit of the group in which the
accidents of birth or occupation or fellowship have given us a place.” 9
The years following the delivery and publication of The Nature
of the Judicial Process saw the transformation of Benjamin Cardozo
from a well-known judge to a judge with a national reputation. The
academy lionized him even before he became chief judge of the New
York Court of Appeals, and the court itself was seen as the outstanding
state court in the country. It had several notable judges, Cuthbert
Pound, William Andrews, and Irving Lehman, to name just three, but
it was Cardozo’s opinions that caught the academic public’s eye and
were incorporated into law school casebooks throughout the country.
This was a time when virtually all judges, and not their law clerks,
wrote their judicial opinions. Cardozo wrote in a distinctive style, with
many one-liners that sharpened his meaning. Occasionally flowery and
ornate, at its best the style was crisp and persuasive, and it constitutes
a large part of the explanation for his continuing popularity in the legal
academy. He had the knack of making a great case out of what would
have been humdrum in the hands of most judges. He also had a distinct
personality. He was well bred, well educated, elaborately courteous,

8
9

Id. at 82-83.
Id. at 174-75.
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and his personal kindliness and gentleness in his later years led many
to refer to the “saintly Cardozo.” But no one who was as successful a
courtroom lawyer as Cardozo had been could accurately be described
as a saint. Underneath the gentle demeanor that he later projected was
a self-confident, ambitious, tough-minded man who looked out for
himself and those he loved in a conscientious pursuit of success. He
had the human failings of vanity and prejudice, but he was a good man
with extraordinary talents.
Cardozo never married, but his relationship with his older sister
Nellie provided him with support and warmth as she helped raise him
in his early years, as they presided together over their family and their
home, and finally as he took care of her during her long, last illness.
These experiences helped contribute to his strong personal values of
duty, honor, and individual responsibility that were often evident in his
judicial opinions. Cardozo’s family life and his loyalty to his Sephardic
heritage also reflected a moral and social conservatism that balanced
his progressive, modernizing instincts. His professional achievements
during his forty-six years as lawyer and judge would help redeem the
family name.
The same balanced approach exhibited on the New York Court
of Appeals and in The Nature of the Judicial Process between judicial
innovation and judicial restraint characterized his work during the
relatively brief period he served on the Supreme Court of the United
States. I do not have time, in this talk, to do more than note that while
on the Court he wrote some important opinions, some published and
some not published, that forcefully defended an expansive notion of
the importance of the First Amendment. And then more generally
Cardozo, invoking John Marshall and Oliver Wendell Holmes, took
sides in the theoretical debate of his day – and indeed of ours as well –
with those who believed that the open-ended provisions of the
Constitution were to be reinterpreted in light of changing political,
social, and economic conditions in the country.
Finally, Cardozo is remembered for his style. Cardozo’s main
hobby was reading and he read widely in literature, philosophy, and
even to some extent in science. He was fascinated by language and its
ability to convey thought in striking fashion. He employed his love of
words in a constant effort, occasionally a bit strained, to express his
reasoning in memorable language. That unique style helped make him
known in his day and has helped perpetuate his memory as law
teachers use his opinions to catch the interest of their students. I have
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ended many a talk I have given about Cardozo by letting him speak for
himself. I can think of no better way to end a lecture devoted to the
memory of Cardozo than by quoting some of his more memorable
words:
“The prisoner is to go free because the constable has blundered.” 10
“Not lightly vacated is the verdict of quiescent years.” 11
“Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices
to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it.” 12
“The tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of its logic
may be counteracted by the tendency to confine itself within the limits
of its history.” 13
“Danger invites rescue.” 14
“The timorous may stay at home.” 15
“The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days
apace.” 16
“A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.” 17
“One who is a martyr to a principle . . . does not prove by his
martyrdom that he has kept within the law.” 18

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).
Coler v. Corn Exchange Bank, 164 N.E. 882, 884 (N.Y. 1928).
Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926).
CARDOZO, supra note 6, at 51.
Wagner v. Int’l Ry. Co., 133 N.E. 437, 437 (N.Y. 1921).
Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1929).
Ultramares v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (N.Y. 1931).
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
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“[Of freedom of thought and speech] one may say that it is the matrix,
the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.” 19
“[W]e are not to close our eyes as judges to what we must perceive as
men.” 20
“Justice is not to be taken by storm. She is to be wooed by slow
advances.” 21
“[A] great principle of constitutional law is not susceptible of
comprehensive statement in an adjective.” 22
And finally what I believe to be the most quoted words from my
biography are not from his judicial writings but rather the words he
uttered when he performed the marriage ceremony of a relative:
Three great mysteries there are in the lives of mortal
beings: the mystery of birth at the beginning; the
mystery of death at the end; &, greater than either, the
mystery of love. Everything that is most precious in life
is a form of love. Art is a form of love, if it be noble.
Labor is a form of love, if it be worthy; thought is a
form of love, if it be inspired; and marriage is love
incarnate. So may it be for you throughout all the years
to come. 23
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